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Franks: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment

NOTES & COMMENTS
TIE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

INTRODUCTION

In three recent terms, the United States Supreme Court ruled
on five cases presenting issues raised by the commercial speech doctrine. When the doctrine was first announced by the Court, the characterization of an expression as commercial speech deprived that expression of any first amendment protection. In more recent cases,
however, first amendment protection has been extended to some commercial speech, but the doctrine has retained enough vitality to leave
much commercial speech without constitutional protection. At the
same time, these cases have left unanswered important questions concerning the permissible scope of state regulation in the commercial
speech area.
Dissenting in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc." Justice Rehnquist criticized the current
trend of the Supreme Court in extending constitutional protection to
commercial speech. Accusing the majority of abandoning its previous
"bright line" distinction between commercial (unprotected) and noncommercial (protected) speech, Justice Rehnquist read the majority
opinion as substituting an uncertain and wavering distinction between
truthful speech and speech which is false or misleading. Accordingly,
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the newer standard was far too arbitrary to accomodate the range of factors which should influence a decision on whether commercial advertising may be regulated.2
Thorough examination of the recent commercial speech decisions,
however, indicates that the Court has not completely abandoned the
1. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2. Id. at 787.
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distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. Instead,
the distinction appears to remain viable in the determination of whether
a state's regulation of false or deceptive commercial advertising is valid.
In other words, scrutiny of commercial speech for false content or a
tendency to mislead seems to have become an additional factor in determining the extent to which constitutional protection should be given
to a particular expression. As the case law in the commercial speech
area demonstrates, however, the gradual shift in protection accorded
commercial speech essentially belies the difficulty in many circumstances of distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial
speech on the one hand, and between truthful advertising and advertising which is false or misleading on the other.
The commentary which follows will critically examine the Supreme Courts recent decisions in the commercial speech area, in an
attempt to demonstrate that the commercial speech doctrine is still an
integral part of first amendment theory. Furthermore, the discussion
will show that advertisements of all types may still be subjected to substantial state regulation despite the existence of first amendment interests.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Speech UnprotectedBecause of CommercialContent
Although the historical antecedents of the "commercial speech"
exception to the first amendment have been collected and discussed
by other writers, 3 a brief review of the principal decisions is essential
in exploring the current bounds of this important constitutional doctrine.

The earliest distinction made by the United States Supreme Court
between speech entitled to constitutional protection and unprotected
commercial expression was in Valentine v. Chrestensen.4 Mr. Chrestensen was an entrepreneur who had possession of a former U.S. Navy
submarine which he desired to exhibit to the public, for an admission
fee, from a New York City pier. Chrestensen intended to publicize
his exhibition by passing out handbills advertising the attraction. This
intent, however, conflicted with an ordinance prohibiting the circulation
3. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutional Status of Free Expression, 3 HAsTiNos
CONST. L. Q. 761 (1976).
4. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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of advertising material in public streets.5 Because of the difficulty
Chrestensen encountered in obtaining Port Authority permission to
conduct the exhibit, he caused a political protest of the treatment he
received from the police and Port Authority to be printed on the back
of his advertising handbill. The political content of the document did
not, however, prevent Chrestensen's arrest for violation of the ordinance.
An injunction against the enforcement of the law was obtained
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,6 but
that decision was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.7 The Court in Chrestensen found commercial speech completely undeserving of first amendment protection. Perhaps more importantly, it found that the accompanying ideological speech lost whatever constitutional protection it might otherwise have had because of
the presence of the commercial content. 8
As a result of Chrestensen and for a number of years thereafter,
the term "commercial speech" was used as an incantation sufficient
to strip any expression with commercial content of all constitutional
protection. This is illustrated by the approach taken by the United
States Supreme Court in Breard v. Alexandriaf The case arose from
a challenge by a magazine salesperson to a local ordinance of the
"Green River" type.' 0 In addition to arguing that the law constituted
a denial of due process and excessively burdened interstate commerce,
Breard protested that the first amendment prohibited the application
of the ordinance to prevent the door-to-door solicitation of magazine
subscriptions. In addressing the free expression argument, the Court
in Breard noted a "commercial feature"" which distinguished the case
from earlier decisions in which door-to-door distribution of religious
material had been found worthy of first amendment protection.' 2 The
5. NEw YoRK Crry,N.Y., SANrr,A

CoDE, § 318 (1940).
6. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941).
7. 316 U.S. at 53.
8. "It is enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular
was with the intent and for the purpose of evading the prohibition of the ordinance."
Id. at 55.
9. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
10. The general effect of such an ordinance, styled after GREEN RIVER, Wyo., ORD.
# 175, was to declare door-to-door solicitation by uninvited peddlers to be a nuisance,
punishable as a misdemeanor. See generally Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co.,
65 F.2d 1,12 (10thCir. 1933).
11. 341 U.S. at 642.
12. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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ordinance in Breard was directed solely at commercial solicitation, i.e.
peddlers, and this feature apparently devitalized any first amendment
protection otherwise extended to magazine distribution.
The Chrestensen and Breard cases together appear to support the
proposition that the state may regulate, on merely rational grounds,
expression with commercial content where the only constitutional protection sought is the right of the speaker to impart the message."8 In
subsequent cases,14 however, the Supreme Court recognized two principles which have recently led to the extension of some first amendment protection to commercial speech. The first group of cases extended protection to commercial speech in spite of its commercial content. The second group, on the other hand, extended protection because of the commercial content.' 5
First Amendment Protectionof Speech Despite Commercial Content 0
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'7 the Supreme Court held
that a paid commercial advertisement soliciting contributors to a fund
was protected by the first amendment even though a "commercial feature" was clearly present.' 8 The issue was whether an individual libeled by false statements in a newspaper solicitation could recover
damages from the publisher. The Court held that the defamed plaintiff could not recover absent proof that the paper knew the defamatory
statements were false or had recklessly disregarded their lack of truth.'0
To reach this conclusion, the Court found it necessary to distinguish Chrestensen on two grounds. First, the purpose of Chrestensen's
ad was the commercial solicitation of business. In New York Times
there was no business purpose. More importantly, there was a public
13. 341 U.S. at 649.
14. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
15. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
16. The development of the commercial speech doctrine as an exception to first
amendment protection occurred while the Court was demarking two other first amendment exceptions, incitement in political speech and obscenity. However, although the
Court has articulated standards for these excepted areas, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), it has yet to explicitly
state any parameters for permissible regulation of commercial speech.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. The allegedly libelous expression was a paid advertisement soliciting contribu.
tions to the Committee to Defend Doctor Martin Luther King and The Struggle for
Freedom in the South. Id. at 293.
19. Id. at 279-80.
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interest in receiving the content of the advertisement in New York
Times.20 Despite these glib distinctions, however, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the handbills in Chrestensen also "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, and protested claimed
abuses". 2 Thus, in the final analysis, New York Times may be construed as narrowing the commercial speech exception to cases where
it is the sole intent of the speaker to solicit sales of a commercial product or service pursuant to a profit motive. This form of expression
could be characterized as pure commercial speech.
Several recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court
have made it clear that "even commercial speech" is entitled to some
degree of first amendment protection. The earliest of these cases was
Bigelow v. Virginia,22 in which the Court struck down a Virginia
statute prohibiting the advertisement of abortions by imposing criminal
sanctions.2 3 Bigelow was the editor of a newspaper which had published
and ad soliciting the sale of legal abortion referral services by a profitmaking New York agency.
In Bigelow the Supreme Court, for the first time, applied the first
amendment to invalidate a state act prohibiting speech which, on its
face, did no more than solicit the sale of services conducted solely for
profit.24 The holding was based on the public's need for knowledge
upon which to base informed, constitutionally protected decision-making, i.e., a mother's decision of whether or not to bear a child.2" The
existence of this interest caused the Court to treat the basic advertisement as more than a simple proposal for a commercial transaction, because the transaction itself had independent constitutional significance
to the public.
FirstAmendment Protectionof Speech Because of Commercial
Content
Less than a year after Bigelow, the Supreme Court decided Vir20. Id. at 266.

21. Id. See discussion of Valentine v. Chrestensen infra.
22. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

23. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960) provides:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or through the use of a referral agency for profit, or
in any other manner, encourages or promotes the processing of an abortion or
miscarriage to be performed in this State which is prohibited under this article,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
24. See Note, 12 URBAN L. ANN. 221 (1976).
25. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
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ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council,
Inc.,2 6 a case which has been the subject of a constant stream of comment and criticism.2 7 The Virginia Board decision involved a challenge to a Virginia statute declaring pharmacists guilty of "unprofessional conduct" if they advertised the retail prices at which pharmaceuticals would be sold. 28 The challenge was raised by an organization
of consumers of retail prescription drugs and was primarily based on
the asserted right of consumers to receive such retail price information.
The State of Virginia argued that the statute was a rational exercise of the police power in an area where important health and safety
considerations were at stake. 29 The State maintained that a level of
judicial scrutiny more demanding than mere rationality would be inappropriate, since the speech for which the consumers sought constitutional protection was devoid of political or ideological content. Furthermore, there was no relationship between this pure commercial
speech and the exercise of any other constitutional interest, such as
a mother's abortion decision. The State contended that, as pure commercial speech, such ads were completely unworthy of constitutional
protection.30
Speaking for the Court in Virginia Board, Justice Blackmun found
that the concept of "commercial speech" as a totally unprotected exception to the first amendment had "all but passed from the scene' in
Bigelow.3 He characterized the issue in the case as whether speech
with no content other than a proposal for a purely commercial transac82
tion, i.e. "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price,"
was imbued with an inherent constitutional significance sufficient to
justify some degree of first amendment protection.
In order to resolve this issue, Justice Blackmun identified the interests arrayed against the state's attempted prohibition of the advertisements. First, the advertiser in Virginia Board had a purely eco26. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Note, 60 MARQuETr L. R. 138 (1976); Note, 51 TuLAN L. R. 149
(1976).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 provides:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who...
(3) publishes, advertises, or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner
whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms
for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs
which may be dispensed only by prescription.
29. 425 U.S. at 757.
30. Id. at 758.
31. Id. at 760.
32. Id. at 761.
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nomie interest in delivering his message. However, the Court has protected purely economic interests in labor disputes, and it seems clear

that the presence of such an interest would not prevent constitutional
protection.3 3

Second, the public has an interest in the free flow of

information generally. 34 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Justice Blackmun identified a constitutional right of consumers, as distinguished from the public, to receive, without unjustified state interfer-

ence, information necessary for informed private economic decision35
making.
Of these three interests, it should be emphasized that the only
operative consideration is the consumer's right to know, because it is
the only interest which is a variable. Because of the Court's definition

of commercial speech, which requires an element of commercial solicitation,3" the speaker's purely economic interest in soliciting a commer-

cial transaction will always be present. This interest, moreover, will
remain constant where there is no associated political or ideological
content. Furthermore, absent any countervailing interest, the general
public interest in the free flow of information seems to be little more
than an affirmation that a free market place of ideas is the sine qua
non of a free society.3 7 Therefore, based on the logic of Virginia

Board, the result in any case involving state prohibitions on commercial
speech may only be explained by reference to the significance of the
particular consumer interest at stake. Under this analysis, neither the

speaker's interest nor the general public interest favoring dissemination
of the commercial speech would be independently sufficient to invalidate a commercial speech regulation.
33. See, e.g. National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
The main interest of striking workers in a labor dispute is economic. Nonetheless,
workers may rely upon the first amendment to protect their right to make wage demands.
34. 425 U.S. at 766.
35. Id. at 765.
36. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
37. One of the best known statements stressing the importance of free speech as a
general societal value is Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideasthat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
This view of the general public value of free expression was also a basic component of
the philosophy of John Stewart Mill. See generally G. HmimELFARB, ON ITBERTY AND
LIBERALISM,

23-56 (1974).
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Having identified the constitutional interests opposing enforcement of the statute, Justice Blackmun identified the particular state
interests supporting the advertising ban. These interests included a
legitimate desire for a high degree of professionalism and expertise,
and speculation that advertising might have an adverse effect on
prices. 38 Although any one of these state interests would have been
sufficient to justify regulation of an area not entitled to first amendment
protection, the Court held they were insufficient when balanced against
the consumer's need for the information contained in the ads.
Because the state was fully equipped to discipline any pharmacist
whose conduct was detrimental to the quality of goods and services
provided to the public, the Court in Virginia Board would not permit
the state to minimize its burden of regulating the profession by keeping
the public ignorant of pharmaceutical pricing practices. Thus, in what
has been characterized by some as the death of the commercial speech
doctrine,3 9 the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's ban on prescription price advertisements.40
The Virginia Board decision concluded with dicta which reintroduced uncertainty into issues which had appeared settled earlier in the
opinion. For example, although the opinion seems to state at one point
that there no longer is a commercial speech exception to the first
amendment, 41 a subsequent footnote appears to imply that some types
of speech with commercial content may still fall outside first amendment protection.42 To further complicate things, the Court in Virginia
Board indicated that commercial speech may well be subject to substantially more stringent state regulation than speech with political or ideo4
logical content. 3
In the final analysis, the decision in Virginia Board is precedent
for only two propositions. First, the mere recital of the words "commercial speech" by a state no longer provides an independent basis
38. The Pharmacy Board claimed that "prices might not necessarily fall as a result
of advertising. If one pharmacist advertises, others must, and the resulting expense
will increase the cost of drugs." 425 U.S. at 768.
39. See text accompanying note 144 infra.
40. Justice Stevens did not participate in the Court's decision. The only dissent was
by Justice Rehnquist, who felt that the Constitution did not require that "commercial
intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain
: . . [be elevated] to the same plane previously reserved for the free market place of
ideas. . . ." 425 U.S. at 781. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
41. 425 US. at 762.
42. See text accompanying notes 67-90 infra for a discussion of some problems
caused by this inconsistency.
43. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
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for decision.
factors.

It is clear that a court's analysis must focus on other

Second, because of the nature of our economy, some commer-

cial speech is entitled to first amendment protection because it is necessary for informed consumer decisionmaking.

The decision, however,

left unresolved substantial questions concerning burdens of proof, presumptions of constitutionality, and the scope of the constitutional pro-

tection which has been extended to commercial speech.4"
Instead of resolving these issues, the decision in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona45 served only to reinforce the confusion still remaining
in the commercial speech area. The defendants in Bates were young
lawyers who, after working for their local legal aid service following
graduation from law school, decided to open their own legal clinic.
They conceived of a law office geared solely to providing basic legal
services to persons who, though not wealthy, were too solvent to qualify

for free legal aid. It was their intent to restrict the practice to legal
matters which, though usually uncontested, nevertheless required legal

drafting or representation, e.g., uncontested divorces, simple wills, uncontested adoptions. By using standardized forms and a substantial
staff of paralegals and clerical workers, they hoped to be able to handle

a high volume of cases on a low margin, thus realizing a reasonable
profit while providing their community with much needed low cost legal services."'
44. During the October, 1976 term, the Supreme Court announced decisions in three
commercial speech cases, all of which rely on Virginia Board. However, none of these
cases provides much guidance in solving the problems left open by Virginia Board. The
most recent of these cases was Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
Earlier in the term, in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 97 S.
Ct. 1614 (1977), the Court held that the first amendment protection to which commercial speech is entitled prevented the local government from prohibiting the posting
of "for sale" or "sold" signs in the yards of residences. Although the Township argued
an important interest in support of the prohibition, i.e., discouraging "white flight" so
as to preserve a racially integrated community, the Court found the ordinance defective
because it was enacted to prevent residents of the community from receiving information
necessary to "one of the most important decisions they have a right to make: Where
to live and raise their families." 97 S. Ct. at 1620.
In Carey v. Population Services International, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977), the Court
also relied upon Virginia Board to strike down a New York prohibition of contraceptive
advertising. The result in Carey was also supported by the constitutional protection accorded an individual's decision on whether to use contraceptives, which is based on the
right of privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Therefore, the
result in Carey was supported by the rationale of Bigelow as well as that of Virginia
Board.
45. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
46. Brief for the Appellants at 5-9. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct.
2691 (1977).
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Unfortunately, Bates and O'Steen discovered that the type of practice they envisaged was not possible unless the existence and nature
of their practice could be conveyed to the potential consumers of their

services. 47 They reasoned that such widespread knowledge was impossible without advertising; yet this requirement placed them squarely
in conflict with the disciplinary rules of the Arizona Bar, as adopted
from the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibil48

ity.

Bates and O'Steen decided to test the validity of this blanket prohibition of professional advertising. Toward that end, they ran what

will hereafter be referred to as the "Bates Ad" in the "Arizona Republic" issue for February 22, 1976. The ad listed the fees for several
of the lawyer's standardized services and characterized the fees as "very
reasonable". The President of the state bar subsequently filed a com-

plaint against the lawyers. Pursuant to a disciplinary procedure, they
were suspended from practice for one week by the State Bar Board
of Governors.

Appealing the Bar decision to the Arizona Supreme Court,40 Bates
and O'Steen argued that under the logic of the Virginia Board case,

their truthful, nondeceptive advertisement was entitled to first amendment protection based on the right of consumers to receive information
necessary ,to informed decision-making in the open commercial market.

Such decision-making they maintained, is the primary regulatory device
of our free enterprise economic system. However, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument, relying on an aside to the Virginia
Board decision which had distinguished professional services from the

sale of standardized products."0

Because of the myriad of factors

47. Id. at 2694.
48. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), under which the attorneys were suspended, reads
in part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display announcements
in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor
shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
The remainder of the section lists a number of specific exceptions to the rule which
would allow limited identification of a lawyer in certain publications; however, no argument was made that the Bates advertisement fell within one of the special rules.
49. 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
50. The Court stated:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial
advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions may
require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for
example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional ser-

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss4/5

10

Franks: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment

1977)

COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

which contribute to the cost and value of legal services, the Arizona
court determined that advertising of professional services fell entirely
outside any protection the first amendment might otherwise provide
to commercial speech. The court, therefore, affirmed the disciplinary
action imposed by the Arizona Bar on the errant appellant attorneys. 51
The decision was immediately appealed to the United States Supreme Court, thus setting the stage for further explication of the commercial speech doctrine. But the appellants in Bates framed the issues
of their appeal with such narrow specificity that, in the resulting opinion, Justice Blackmun found it unnecessary to declare new constitutional law. The majority found, rather, that the facts of Bates fell directly within the law of Virginia Board. As a result, the Bates decision
is more remarkable for the issues it specifically reserves than for its
exposition of new constitutional doctrine. As the analysis which follows will demonstrate, despite the far reaching consequences some feel
the decision will have on professional advertising,5 2 the case represents
no more than a very narrow extension of the law of Virginia Board
to facts which, although different, are analogous to those in the earlier
decision.
The Bates Decision-New Lav or New Facts?
The Supreme Court in Bates reversed the state court decision on
first amendment grounds. 53 The first amendment portion of the Bates
opinion involves a fairly lengthy review of the Virginia Board opinion,
including citation of the cases on which that decision relied. This review concluded by noting that the only first amendment issue presented
by the appellants in Bates was whether the professional services/product sales distinction reserved in Virginia Board 4 was of any constitutional significance.
vices of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of
advertising.
425 U.S. at 773 n.25.
51. Bates and O'Steen also raised vagueness and due process arguments before the
Arizona Supreme Court. 113 Ariz. at -, 555 P.2d at 646. These arguments were
abandoned on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, in recognition of
the right of citizens to challenge unconstitutional exercises of state power, the Arizona
court noted that the sole motivation which led the lawyers to place their ad was the
desire to test the constitutionality of the advertising ban. As a result, the court reduced
the sanctions imposed by the State Bar to censure. Id. at -, 555 P.2d at 646.
52. See 97 S. Ct. at 2712 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Justice Blackmun was joined in his majority opinion by Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and Stevens.
54. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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To underscore the narrowness of the issue, the opinion recited
a number of questions upon which the decision was intended to have
no bearing. Thus, the Court in Bates explicitly reserved evaluation
of constitutional questions which might be raised by advertisements
concerning the quality of services provided or in person solicitation.
Furthermore, the Court implicitly reserved those issues raised by a basic factual ad indicating no more than the existence and location of
a law office, with no reference to fees or available services. 55
These reserved questions limited the holding of the Court to a
single, narrow issue: "The heart of the dispute before us today is
whether lawyers also may constitutionally advertise the prices at which
certain routine services will be performed." '
Having defined the issue, Justice Blackmun reviewed the justifications offered by the state
in support of its advertising ban.17 Perhaps the bar's strongest argument was that lawyer advertising would be inherently misleading. The
gist of this argument, which formed the core of the dissents by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stewart, was that the public
may be so unfamiliar with what will be required of a lawyer in a particular situation that legal consumers cannot understand the services
the lawyer is offering for the advertised price.58 Furthermore, consumers would be unable to judge whether the service advertised would
satisfy their particular needs. However, although the majority recognized that a lawyer ad could be deceiving, it also felt that nondeceptive
advertising was possible. The court was unwilling to assume that consumers are not sophisticated enough to realize "the limitations of advertising" and was "dubious of any argument based on the benefits of
public ignorance. 9
The bar also argued that lawyer advertising would promote unnecessary litigation and increase lawyer overhead and ultimate con55. 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
56. Id. at 2701 (emphasis in original).
57. One of the justifications posited was that advertising by lawyers would lead to
commercialization which in turn would lead to reduced public respect for the legal profession. The majority, however, found that any vitality this argument may otherwise
have had was substantially undermined by the admission of the Bar's attorney that to
characterize the practice of law as noncommercial was "sanctimonious humbug".
58. 97 S. Ct. at 2710 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at
2711 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist based his
dissent on the grounds that the Chrestensen commercial speech exception to the first
amendment was sound constitutional doctrine and was dispositive of all issues raised in
Bates. Id. at 2719.
59. Id. at 2704.
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sumer costs. Moreover, preventing deception by lawyers would impose a crippling policing burden on the bar if ads were permitted.
The majority responded to these arguments by finding that the
historical effect of price advertising is lower prices, despite the fact
that advertising budgets increase overhead. In addition, the court felt
that lawyers as a class are conscientious professionals who would neither cut comers nor push their advertising materials so close to the
line between truth and deception as to create a regulatory burden for
the bar. As the dissents pointed out, however, this last observation
is particularly interesting in light of the lack of authoritative guidance
on how state bars may deal with deception in attorney advertising.
The majority's refusal to accept the Arizona Bar's regulatory burden argument indicated no more than the bar's inability to convince
the Court that such a burden potentially existed. Should deception
problems develop in practice, there is nothing in the language of Bates
to indicate that this state interest might not outweigh the constitutional
interests at stake in lawyer advertisements:
We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will
behave as they always have: They will abide by their solemn
oaths to uphold the integrity and honor of their profession
and of the legal system. For every attorney who overreaches
through advertising there will be thousands of others who will
be candid and honest and straight forward.60
As Justice Blackmun originally framed the Bates issue, the task
of the Court was to determine if there was any constitutional significance to the distinction between standardized products and nonstandardized services. His analysis, however, avoided that question by
finding that the services advertised in Bates were analogous to the prepackaged prescription ads permitted under the Virginia Board rationale. That this analogy forms the basis of the majority decision is underscored by the Court's observation that:
Although many services performed by attorneys are indeed unique, it is doubtful that any attorney would or could
advertise fixed prices for services of that type. The only
services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine
ones: the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of
name, and the like-the very services advertised by appellants.6
60. Id. at 2707.
61. Id. at 2703.
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The Bates majority did address one question which had not been
considered in Virginia Board. The Court found the overbreadth doctrine inapplicable in all commercial speech cases. In a first amendment case involving political or ideological speech, the doctrine would
allow a litigant whose speech could have been prohibited or regulated
by a narrowly drawn statute to challenge an overbroad statute on the
grounds that it also infringed protected speech. If the overbreadth
doctrine were applied in Bates, the appellants would be allowed to
challenge the Arizona advertising prohibition even if their own ad were
false or deceptive, and, therefore, unworthy of first amendment protection on its own.
But the Court held that interests which justify application of the
overbreadth doctrine in most free speech cases are different from the
constitutional interests underlying the protection of commercial speech.
In other words, the overbreadth doctrine typically applies where the
constitutional value at stake is the interest of the speaker in conveying
his message. A statute applicable to both protected and unprotected
speech could deter speakers from expressing themselves at all, since
its mere existence would have a "chilling effect" on protected expres62
sion.
In the case of commercial speech, however, the speaker's interest
is of minor importance. As indicated by the earlier analysis of Virginia
Board, the operative interest is the consumer's need for information
which is necessary for constiutionally significant decision-making. This
analysis is consistent with Justice Blackmun's observation that, in a
commercial speech case, the speaker's interest merits little regard because the profit motive associated with commercial speech assures that
the speaker will seek out and find a permissible outlet for his advertising. He is unlikely to be "chilled" and, therefore, there is no need
to apply the overbreadth doctrine. 3
Since the overbreadth analysis was inappropriate to Bates, the majority found it necessary to scrutinize the Bates Ad to determine
62. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
63. The opinion also focused on the peculiar ability of an advertiser to become
familiar with its own product, thus justifying a high standard for truth in advertising
and a corresponding low standard of constitutional protection for commercial advertising:
Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such
speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation
(citation omitted). Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in determining the
scope of protection are reduced; the advertiser seeks to disseminate information
about a product or a service he provides, and presumably he can determine
more readily than others whether his speech is truthful and protected.
97 S. Ct. at 2707 (citations omitted).
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whether it was false, deceptive, misleading, or in some other manner
undeserving of constitutional protection. 4 Determining that it was not,
the opinion concluded by noting "some of the clearly permissible limitations on advertising not foreclosed by our holding. ' 65 These included restraints on false, deceptive, or misleading advertising; time,
place, and manner restrictions; restrictions on the advertising of illegal
transactions; and, possibly, other restrictions based on the content of
the advertisement.
The court also recited dicta contained in the Virginia Board decision. This dicta included the Court's declaration that commercial
speech is distinguishable from other kinds of speech, that it is regulable
regarding time, place and manner, and that the state may act to prevent
fraud or deception. The Court treated these questions as settled issues,
although the opinion contained little guidance for the regulation of
commercial speech in any of these areas. Regardless of how the Court
ultimately resolves the questions specifically reserved by Bates,66 it is
certain that the future will also present further litigation on the issues
treated as settled by the dicta in the case. The remainder of this comment is directed toward an analysis of questions which are likely to form
the bases for state regulation in this area.
REGULATION OF TIME, PLACE AND MANNER OF
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
In Virginia Board, the Supreme Court stated that the extension of first amendment protection in that case in no way limited
the power of the state to impose reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on commercial speech.6 7 This dicta was later cited with
approval in Bates.68 Neither case, however, presented the issue of
whether a regulation could be upheld as a time, place or manner restriction. As a result, they give no guidance on how this type of regulation should apply in a commercial speech context.
It may be that guidance is not required with particular reference
to commercial speech because, according to the Court in Virginia
Board, time, place and manner regulations are valid only if conceived
and imposed completely without reference to content. The regulation
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 2708.
Id.
Id. at 2709.
425 U.S. at 771.

68. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
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must also serve a "significant government interest" and leave ample
alternative means of communication. 9 Under this three-step formulation, it would appear that a characterization of speech as commercial
or noncommercial would be irrelevant."0 Unfortunately, this test still
leaves the difficult problem of distinguishing between regulations justified without reference to content and impermissible regulations which
are based on content.
The Supreme Court demonstrated the pitfalls of drawing such a
distinction in Bigelow v. Virginia, where the majority opinion by Justice
Blackmun interpreted the Chrestensen holding as limited to sustaining
a "reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed." 71 The implication of this holding is that
the ordinance in Chrestensen was upheld as a reasonable time, place
and manner restriction. If this interpretation is correct, Chrestensen
did not raise a first amendment issue.
Although it is true that in Chrestensen the plaintiff had methods
of advertising other than handbilling available to him, and the government did have a significant interest in preventing litter, it is also true
that the challenged ordinance only prohibited commercial handbilling.
The regulation was imposed solely on the basis of the content of the
speech. As a result, Justice Blackmun's characterization appears to
be inconsistent with the three-step test generally employed by the
72
Court to evaluate time, place and manner restrictions.
In view of this inconsistency, it is not surprising that lower courts
have encountered difficulty in distinguishing content-oriented regulations from acceptable time, place and manner restrictions. This problem is illustrated by several recent commercial speech cases dealing
with regulation and prohibition of outdoor billboards and signs under
the Federal Highway Beautification Act7 3 and other laws.
One of these cases, although reaching a result consistent with the
three-step test, nevertheless demonstrates some judicial confusion as
to whether consideration should be given to the content of a particular
expression when a determination is made of the regulation's validity.
69. 425 U.S. at 771.
70. But see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (availability of alternate forums
could not be used to justify a ban on street distribution of leaflets containing political
speech),
71. 421 U.S. at 819.
72. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
73. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1966).
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In Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Baltimore,7 4 the Maryland
Court of Appeals relied upon Virginia Board in deciding that an ordinance prohibiting nearly all outdoor billboards within a Baltimore urban renewal area was not unconstitutional. The ordinance in question
prohibited "all signs other than those identifying the property where
they are installed or identifying the use conducted therein. .... 75
The ordinance was challenged on a number of grounds, 76 including an argument based on first amendment protection of commercial
speech. In its analysis, the court in Donnelly acknowledged that the
billboards in question were entitled to some degree of first amendment7
protection. But the court also cited Young v. American Mini Theatres
for the proposition that the degree of first amendment protection to
which a particular advertisement might be entitled could be determined
by reference to the content of the advertisement. 75 The Donnelly court
noted, however, that the Baltimore ordinance was imposed without
reference to content because it banned "all messages, whatever their
content. '79 The court concluded its analysis of the first amendment
issue by stating its version of the three-step test for time, place and
manner regulations, holding that such regulations must further a substantial government interest, be unrelated to the suppression of free
more restrictive than necessary to further the
expression, and be no
80
government interests.
The nature of the reference to Young by the court in Donnelly
is clouded by the subsequent conclusion that the ordinance should be
sustained because it was imposed without reference to content; thus
no first amendment interests were at stake. The opinion did recognize,
parenthetically, that one aspect of the ordinance was clearly based on
content, i.e., the exception in favor of signs advertising the premises
upon which the sign was located. Accordingly, the reference to the
Young quotation may have been intended only to justify allowing that
distinction to stand. At any rate, despite the superficial confusion over
74. 370 A.2d 1127 (Md. 1977).
75. BALTIMORE, MD., OLDTOWN URBAN RENEWAL ORniNANcE, #760, § 5(g) (,1970).
76. In addition to the first amendment attack based on Virginia Board, the plaintiffs
claimed that the ordinance was an exercise of the zoning power and that its enactment
was procedurally defective. They also argued that the ordinance deprived them of property without compensation and denied them equal protection of the law. The court
found no merit to any of these arguments. 370 A.2d at 1132-34.
77. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For a more detailed examination of this case, see text accompanying notes 133-138 infra.
78. Id. at 68.
79. 370 A.2d at 1132.
80. Id.
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the distinction between content-oriented regulation and permissible
time, place and manner restrictions, the Maryland court appears to have
applied a test and reached a result consistent with the treatment of
time, place and manner restrictions of the Supreme Court in Virginia
Board, Bates, and other recent cases. 81
In Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 2 an intermediate New
York appellate court attempted to apply the same test to similar facts,
but reached a result which appears to be unsupportable under the
three-step standard announced in Virginia Board. In the Modjeska
decision, the court considered a challenge to a New York statute banning advertising signs in the Adirondack and Catskill state parks, except where permits were obtained. 8 The plaintiff operated a large
number of outdoor billboards in the parks, none of which qualified
for a permit. Therefore, the plaintiff had no choice but to remove
the signs after the expiration of a grace period.
As in Donnelly, the challenge in Modjeska was based on a number
of grounds. Of interest here, however, is the court's brief treatment
of the plaintiff's contention that the ban infringed first amendment interests entitled to protection under Virginia Board. The New York
court recognized that Virginia Board required some protection of first
amendment interests, but also noted that, under Virginia Board, commercial speech was still a proper subject for some state regulation. The
decision recognized a legitimate state interest in controlling ugliness
in state parks and identified several alternative channels of communication which were available to the plaintiff, including newspaper,
radio and television advertising. As a result of the analysis in Modjeska, the court upheld the state billboard ban. Significantly, however,
the court failed to consider the interest of highway travelers in receiving
the information conveyed by billboards.
Perhaps even more significantly, the Modjeska decision neglected
to comment on whether the regulation was imposed without reference
to content, the third component of the test for a permissible time, place
and manner restriction. 4 In fact, the statute on its face was clearly based
81. See note 44 supra.
82. 390 N.Y.S.2d 945 (S. Ct. 1977).

83. NEW Yopn ENVIRONMrNTAL CONSERVAMON LAW § 9-3050(1) (1972).
84. 390 N.Y.S.2d at 949. Although the court did not explicitly state that it considered the statute a time, place and manner restriction, this inference may be drawn
from the language and the analytical methodology of the court. However, the result
might also be explained by assuming the court recognized that the statutory ban was
directed solely at the content of commercial speech. The court may have balanced the
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on content. Unlike the ordinance upheld in Donnelly which, except
for on-premises signs, banned all billboards regardless of whether their
message "be of a commercial, political, or charitable nature",8 5 the New
York statute prohibited only "any advertising sign, advertising structure, or devise of any kind, except under written permit from the department." 80 Although the New York court did not address the issue,
the statute would presumably have no application to a park billboard
containing a purely political, noneconomic, nonadvertising message as,
for example, "Get the U.S. out of the U.N."5' 1
The courts in Donnelly and Modjeska both upheld the challenged
regulations even though the differences between the statutes were apparently of constitutional significance. This could be explained by assuming that the New York court interpreted Virginia Board as implying that time, place and manner regulations may be imposed in a somewhat more restrictive manner in commercial speech cases than in cases
of political or ideological speech. Such a reading would require, in
all cases, a preliminary determination of whether the speech was commercial. This requirement, however, would automatically undermine
the usual rule that a time, place and manner regulation should not refer
to content.

If, in fact, this was the New York court's interpretation of Virginia
Board, it is not altogether untenable, even in light of Bates and other
recent commercial speech decisions. In Virginia Board, the Court
consumer/tourist's interests in receiving information concerning food, lodging and entertainment against the general public interest in uncluttered state parks and concluded that
the need for tourist information was outweighed by the desire for natural, undeveloped
state parks. Whether it would be appropriate for the court to consider any of these content-oriented facors in its balancing is a matter of speculation. For further analysis,
see text accompanying notes 133-143 infra.
85. 370 A.2d at 1132.
86. NEw YORK ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW, § 9-3050(a).

The result in

this case would have been correct if the court had chosen to avoid the constitutional
issue by construing the statute as banning all signs in the parks. If construed in that
manner, the statute would be clearly justifiable as a time, place, and manner limitation.
However, there is no hint in the opinion that the court considered such a construction.
87. Another issue raised by Modjeska, though it was not discussed by the opinion,
is the validity of the statutory permit requirement. Licensing and permit requirements
for exercise of political and ideological speech must generally be drawn with particular
specificity and are usually required to relate directly to an important state interest. See
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
However, in light of the second class protection to which commercial speech appears
to be entitled, it may be that states will be allowed greater latitude in requiring licenses
and imposing prior restraints in commercial speech cases. This potential is supported
by the observation in Virginia Board that the common sense differences between commercial speech and other speech may mean that the prohibition against prior restraints
would be inapplicable to commercial speech. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
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clearly asserted that "commonsense differences" exist between commercial speech and other varieties of speech. Therefore, commercial
speech is entitled to a "different degree of protection" than other communications."8 Restrictions on the constitutional protection extended
to commercial speech, however, tend to obscure the meaning of the
Court's otherwise clear statement that time, place and manner regulations must be imposed without reference to content.
To summarize, the general standard for review of a regulation
which the state attempts to justify as a time, place and manner restriction is clearly stated in Virginia Board and requires that such a regulation must be imposed without reference to content. But this standard
leaves courts with the difficult problem of distinguishing between impermissible content-oriented regulations and legitimate restrictions
based on interests such as aesthetics, litter, privacy or traffics 9 The
problem of evaluating a time, place and manner restriction is further
complicated by the Supreme Court's recognition in Virginia Board that
commercial speech differs from other types of speech. As the Modjeska decision demonstrates, some courts may find these differences
significant in reviewing commercial speech regulations. The Supreme
Court has not yet indicated what effect these differences may have
on the validity of time, place and manner regulations. Until it does,
the inconsistencies between cases like Donnelly and Modjeska are certain to occur in the lower courts. 90
REGULATION OF ADVERTISEMENTS WHICH ARE DECEPTIVE
OR CONCERN ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS

Both Bates and Virginia Board explicitly stated that advertisements which are deceptive or concern illegal transactions would be subject to state regulation." The opinions are less clear, however, on
whether there are any first amendment interests to be considered by
state regulation of these types of ads. Nonetheless, there are indica88.

Id.

89. The difficulties in drawing this distinction are pointed out by the differing views
of the majority and dissent in People v. Remeny, 355 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 1976). In that
case, the New York Court of Appeals relied on Virginia Board in declaring unconstitutional the New York City ordinance which was the successor to the law found constitutional by the Supreme Court in Chrestensen. The majority held that the ordinance was
an impermissible content-oriented regulation. Justice Jasen, however, dissented on the
basis that the city's interest in controlling the place and manner of handbilling outweighed the constitutional protection extended to commercial speech by Virginia Board.
90. See also Modjeska Sign Studios v. Berle, 386 N.Y.S.2d 765 (S. Ct. 1976).
91. 97 S. Ct. at 2708-09; 425 U.S. at 771-72.
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tions in Bates and other cases that the first amendment may require
some balancing of interests even where an advertisement contains false
or deceptive material or pertains to an illegal transaction.
PittsburghPress and Illegal Advertisements
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Pittsburgh Press
v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations9 2 indicated that advertisements concerning illegal transactions were to be excepted from the
degree of first amendment protection to which commercial advertisements might otherwise be entitled. 9 3 At the time of the Pittsburgh
Press decision, however, the Court had not yet determined that some
commercial speech was entitled to first amendment protection because
of the importance of its content to consumers. This narrowing of the
commercial speech exception to the first amendment was the result
of Bigelow v. Virginia and other subsequent cases. 94 However, Pittsburgh Press did provide early hints that the Court was prepared to
extend some degree of protection to commercial speech. 5 Furthermore, because the Supreme Court could choose to treat deception in
advertising just as it treated illegality in Pittsburgh Press, an analysis
of the case is useful to the examination of both issues.
The Pittsburgh Press decision was based on a conflict between
the Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh 6 and the
editorial policies of a major newspaper, the Pittsburgh Press. The ordinance proscribed employment discrimination on the basis of sex and
other grounds, and made it an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to publish a "help wanted" ad indicating discrimination on
the basis of sex. The Pittsburgh Press was charged with violating the
section of the ordinance making it unlawful for any person to aid another in any act constituting an unlawful employment practice under
the ordinance.
Pursuant to a complaint filed by the National Organization of
Women, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations determined
that the newspaper's policy of placing help-wanted ads under sex-designated column headings was an unlawful practice forbidden by the ordi92. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
93. Id. at 388.
94. See notes 17-25 supra and accompanying text.
95. 413 U.S. at 386-88.
96. PITTSBURGH, PA., ORDiNANCE # 75 (1967), as amended, ORDINANCE

#

395

(1969), §§ 8(a), (e), (j).
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nance. 97 The Commission found that the practice assisted employers
in engaging in sex discrimination in their job adsY8
The Commission ordered the paper to utilize a job advertisement
classification system without reference to sex. On appeal,9" a state
court modified the order to bar "reference to sex in employment advertising column headings, except as may be exempt under said Ordinance
or as may be certified exempt by said Commission."' 00 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the order infringed the
freedom of the press. 10 1
In support of its order, the Human Relations Commission argued
that the regulation was directed solely to commercial speech and, therefore, no first amendment challenge was possible.' 0 2 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, agreed that the sex-designated column headings and accompanying ads were "classic examples of commercial
speech.' 0 3 He also agreed with the newspaper, however, that despite
Chrestensen and the commercial speech exception to the first amendment, some degree of constitutional protection for commercial advertising might be appropriate in some cases. 0 4 Nevertheless, in this case
the Court found the first amendment arguments unpersuasive, since
employment discrimination is illegal commercial activity. Thus, commercial speech concerning illegal transactions was treated by the Court
as a specific exception to first amendment protection.'"°
It would appear from this decision that speech concerning illegal
activity loses first amendment protection only when it can be characterized as commercial. Political and ideological speech are not unpro97. The columns were headed "Jobs-Male Interest"; "Jobs-Female Interest"; and
"Male-Female." 413 U.S. at 379.
98. Id. at 380.
99. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission On Human Relations, 287 A.2d
161 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
100. Id. at 172. Because the ordinance permitted sex discrimination where necessitated by a "bona fide occupational exception," the commonwealth court held that
the prohibition of all sex-designated column headings went beyond the statutory grant
of power to the Commission. Although the Commission apparently considered the
newspaper's first amendment defense in the original hearing, there is no indication that
the issue was examined by the appellate court.
101. 409 U.S. 1036 (1972).
102. 413 U.S. at 386.
103. Id. at 385.
104. This dicta from Pittsburgh Press was the first sign by the Court that it was prepared to conduct the major re-evaluation of the commercial speech doctrine which has
taken place in Bigelow, Virginia Board and subsequent decisions. See Note, 12 DuQUESNE L. R. 1000 (1974).
1105. The Court analogized the sex-designated job column headings to headings of
"Narcotics for Sale" or "Prostitutes Wanted." 413 U.S. at 388.
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tected simply because the subject matter is an illegal act. The first
amendment requires the state to meet a stricter standard of scrutiny
in order to regulate or suppress such speech.' 00

Therefore, in order

for a particular expression to be excepted from first amendment protection if it concerns an illegal transaction, it must be distinguished from
political or ideological speech based on its commercial content. Although the Supreme Court appeared to have little difficulty making
this distinction in PittsburghPress,0 7 other courts have found that the

mixture of commercial and noncommercial elements in many advertisements make such a distinction virtually impossible to justify. 0 8

The Court in Pittsburgh Press found it unnecessary to balance
first amendment interests in order to affirm the Commission's order,
as modified. In his dissent, however, Chief Justice Burger criticized
the majority decision, which he perceived as an enlargement of the
commercial speech exception to the first amendment at the expense

of freedom of the press.' 0 9 Justice Burger was willing to assume, without deciding, that there were no first amendment interests preventing

the state from regulating the content of commercial speech. However,
he was unwilling to sustain the Commission's order in light of what

he believed to be an important constitutional interest of editors in
exercising discretion in the organization and layout of their newspapers.
In deciding that the Commission's order should have been re-

versed, the Chief Justice placed particular emphasis on the "Notice
to Job Seekers" which the editors inserted at the top of each sex-designated column heading. 110 He believed that the newspaper's first

amendment interest in controlling its own format required that the "Notice" be scrutinized to determine whether it overcame the tendency

of the column headings to discriminate on the basis of sex.",'
106. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
107. See 413 U.S. at 385.
108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 354 A.2d 27 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
109. 413 U.S. at 393.
110. The notice advised readers that:
Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the convenience
of our readers. This is done because most jobs generally appeal more to persons of one sex than the other. Various laws and ordinances, local, state and
federal, prohibit discrimination in employment because of sex unless sex is a
bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the advertisement specifies one
sex or the other, job seekers should assume that the advertiser will consider
applicants of either sex in compliance with the laws against discrimination.
413 U.S. at 394.
111. The majority briefly examined and summarily dismissed the importance of this
notice to the issue of the case. Id, at 381 n.7.
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Chief Justice Burger seemed to imply in his dissent that the existence and content of the "Notice to Job Seekers" should have been
considered by the majority as an alternative remedy to the restrictive
ban of sex-designated column headings imposed by the Commission's
order. Although this position was rejected by the PittsburghPress majority, a methodology for accommodating first amendment interests, remarkably similar to that proposed by the Chief Justice, has been utilized by another court in dealing with deceptive advertising, another
commercial speech exception to the first amendment. 112
Regulation of Deceptive CommercialAdvertising
Both the majority opinion and Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
PittsburghPress provide valuable guidance as to how courts might deal
with regulations imposed on deceptive commercial advertising. For
example, deceptive advertising could be excepted from first amendment protection based on its commercial content, its tendency to deceive, and its lack of truth. As with advertising concerning illegal transactions, a court would first have to determine whether the deceptive
or false speech was commercial. Noncommercial speech, even when
false, is generally entitled to substantial first amendment protection.:" 8
But deceptive commercial speech might be regulated without regard
to first amendment interests. This would be consistent with the treatment of ads concerning illegality in PittsburghPress.
On the other hand, even if it recognized that deceptive commercial speech should be treated as excepted from first amendment protection, a court might still find it appropriate to conduct some balancing
of interests in order to find the least restrictive remedy for the deception. This would be consistent with Burger's Pittsburgh Press dissent.
The main difference between the majority opinion and the dissent in
PittsburghPress is the failure of the majority to perceive the existence
of an important constitutional interest; if there is no constitutional interest, there need be no balancing. The Chief Justice, however, identified an important interest in preserving editorial discretion and, therefore, felt compelled to balance that interest against the Commission's
desire to prevent sex discrimination.
112. Beneficial Corporation v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.

Ct. 1679 (1977).
1113. See, e.g., New York Times Co.v.Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Since the PittsburghPress decision, the Supreme Court cases previously discussed have identified at least one important constitutional
interest at stake in every commercial speech case-the right of consumers to obtain information necessary for constitutionally protected economic decision-making. If the presence of this interest requires a balancing, as implied by the Chief Justice's dissent in Pittsburgh Press,
courts might treat deceptive commercial speech as generally excepted
from first amendment protection, yet conduct some type of balancing
in determining the validity of the remedy proposed by the state for
the deception. This type of analysis would be consistent with both
the majority and the dissent in PittsburghPress.
PermissibleRemedies for Deceptive Advertising
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
relied upon Virginia Board in revising a cease-and-desist order issued
by the Federal Trade Commission to remedy deceptive advertising
practices. In Beneficial Corporation v. FTC,114 the Third Circuit
found the FTC order more restrictive than the first amendment interests associated with commercial speech would allow. Although the
Court did not principally rely upon Pittsburgh Press for its conclusion,
the logic of Beneficial is entirely consistent with the preceding analysis
of PittsburghPress.
Beneficial Corporation was engaged in the business of making
consumer loans through the local loan offices of its wholly owned subsidiary, the Beneficial Finance System. In 1969, the Beneficial companies entered the consumer income tax return preparation business.
The management felt that the loan business of the offices would be
enhanced because of the convenience to taxpayers with balances due
to the Internal Revenue Service to borrow money for tax payments
from Beneficial. Experience, however, proved that most taxpayers receive refunds rather than pay additional tax. Therefore, in a new effort to use the tax return business to generate a demand for loans,
Beneficial began to advertise its "Instant Tax Refund" in 1969. After
this slogan had been in use in various campaigns promoting Beneficial's
tax service for more than four years, the FTC filed a complaint alleging
that the "Instant Tax Refund" slogan deceived customers as to the nature of the service provided."15
114. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1679 (1977).
115. Id. at 614. The FrC also challenged, as an unfair trade practice, Beneficiars
use of the tax return information received from customers to facilitate solicitation of
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An administrative law judge convened an evidentiary hearing and
determined that the ads utilizing the slogan violated section five of the
Federal Trade Commission Act."" The Commission affirmed the decision and entered a cease-and-desist order prohibiting Beneficial from
using the offending language in future ads. Beneficial, which had
made substantial expenditures in publicizing the slogan, appealed the
order.
The FTC's conclusion that the ads were deceptive was largely
based on the fact that the "refund" offered by Beneficial was no more
than the regular consumer credit loan offered to the general public.
All loan applicants were required to meet the same qualifications. No
consideration was given to whether Beneficial prepared that applicant's
tax return, and qualification was in no way dependent upon whether
an applicant would receive a tax refund. The Commission also con117
cluded that subsequent changes in the company's advertising copy
could not correct the deceptive effect of the "Instant Tax Refund" slogan because the phrase was "inherently contradictory to the truth of
the offer."" 8
On appeal, the Third Circuit began its analysis of the issues by
defining the nature of the offense. Under section five of the FTC
Act, deceptive advertising is a strict liability offense." 9 Moreover, advertising is judged based on its propensity to deceive.' 20 A finding
of a deceptive tendency by the trial authority is to be treated, for purposes of review, as a question of fact.' 2 ' Also, the scope of review
is limited by the FTC Act 22 to the standard of "substantial evidence
,,123
in the record as a whole ....
The Third Circuit held there was substantial evidence to support
the Commission's finding that the slogan, as used in Beneficial's ads,
loan business. The portion of the Commission's cease-and-desist order entered to
remedy that practice was affirmed without modification by the Third Circuit.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973).
11.7. Between the time of the first "Instant Tax Refund" advertisement in 1969 and
February, 1970, Beneficial's advertising agency reported that the ads were resulting in
' fairly widespread confusion" over whether the service being offered was a loan. 542
F.2d at 617. Beneficial began to make changes in the ads in February, 1970, and by
the time the FTC entered its cease-and-desist order in July, 1975, the ads clearly stated
that the recipient of an "Instant Tax Refund" must "qualify" before "Beneficial will lend
you the equivalent of your refund, in cash, instantly." 542 F.2d at 614.
118. .d. at 618.
119. See generally Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963).
120. See, e.g., Resort Car Rental Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1974).
121. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1973).
123. 542 F.2d at 616.
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had a tendency to deceive. Therefore, the court found that the Commission had not abused its discretion in determining that some remedy
124
was appropriate.
Although the Beneficial decision was made in light of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Virginia Board, the Third Circuit did
not consider the possible effect of first amendment interests on the
power of the FTC to regulate Beneficial's advertisements. The court
apparently assumed that deceptive commercial speech falls within an
exception to the first amendment. This rationale is consistent with
the Supreme Court's treatment in Pittsburgh Press of commercial ad1 25
vertising concerning illegal transactions.
The Third Circuit also recognized that, in spite of the government's legitimate interest in regulating deceptive advertising, the first
amendment nevertheless places limitations on the permissible scope of
such regulation. The court noted that the constitutional protection extended to commercial speech by the Virginia Board decision required
a departure from the usual deference an appellate court gives to an
informed exercise of discretion by an administrative agency.12 6 Therefore, although no constitutional interests need be considered in determining whether a particular ad has a tendency to deceive, the remedial
order based on that determination must be scrutinized to insure
that
27
the order goes no further than necessary to prevent deception.1
The result of this conclusion is to prevent regulation of the language of advertisements, so long as the ad as a whole is not deceptive
or where the addition of text is sufficient to overcome the deceptive
character of other text. This is consistent with Chief Justice Burger's
conclusion in his Pittsburgh Press dissent that in light of the interest
of editors in formating their own paper, the "Notice to Job Seekers"
heading served to cure any tendency the column headings might otherwise have to aid employers in placing ads which discriminated on the
128
basis of sex.
Considering the constitutional interest at stake in Beneficial, the
consumer's right to know, it might be preferable to allow an advertisement to be published whenever its deceptive tendency could be cured
1124. Id. at 618.
125. See notes 92-112 supra and accompanying text.
126. See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 429 (1957).

127. 542 F.2d at 619.
128. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
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by the addition or deletion of material. 12 9 Therefore, the Third Circuit
remanded the remedial portion of the FTC's order for reconsideration
by the Commission of Beneficial's argument that the ads could be
manner and still employ the slodrafted in a completely nondeceptive
130
Refund".
Tax
gan "Instant
Conclusionson Deceptive Advertisements and Advertisements
ConcerningIllegal Transactions

The foregoing analysis suggests a methodology which would allow
courts to give substantial deference to state regulation of deceptive

commercial speech while accommodating the constitutional interest of
providing first amendment protection to commercial speech. The test
would be applied as follows: (1) A finding by the trier of fact of
a tendency to deceive or content concerning an illegal transaction is
conclusive; (2) Such a fact finding will support the conclusion that
the state has a compelling interest in regulating that commercial
speech; (3) However, the state still must justify the regulation it
chooses to impose as the least restrictive means of eliminating the decep-

tion or of divorcing the content of the advertisement from the illegality
of the transaction proposed.

There is no guarantee, of course, that the Supreme Court will
utilize this analysis when it is presented with a case involving deceptive
commercial speech.' s ' But this approach does provide a framework
for considering the constitutional interests at stake in one area where
the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that regulations based on con2
tent are "clearly permissible.'
129. Having identified the constitutional interest at stake, the Court in Beneficial relied, in its subsequent analysis, on a line of FTC Act cases which established a preference for requiring a qualifying explanation to remedy a deceptive advertisement,
rather than requiring excission of the offending matter. These earlier cases were based
on the advertiser's property interest in tradenames and advertising copy, rather than on
first amendment grounds. See generally Jacob Siegal Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946);
FTC v. Royal Mining Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
130. The court gave two examples of what it considered to be permissible ads: (1)
"Beneficial's everyday loan service can provide to regularly qualified borrowers an Instant Tax Refund Anticipation Loan whether not the borrower uses our tax service."
(2) "Beneficial's everyday loan service can provide to any regularly qualified borrower
an instant loan in anticipation of his tax refund. We call it an Instant Tax Refund
Anticipation Loan." 542 F.2d at 619.
131. In Bates, the Court examined the Bates Ad to determine whether it was deceptive. This scrutiny was required by the Court's holding that the overbreadth doctrine
was inapplicable to commercial speech. The only conclusion which can be drawn from
the brief treatment of the deception issue in Bates is that the burden of proving the factual element of "tendency to deceive" is on the state and the burden was not met in
Bates. 97 S. Ct. at 2708.
132. Id.
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OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR REGULATIONS BASED ON THE
CONTENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
In Bates and Virginia Board, the Supreme Court indicated that
time, place and manner regulations were constitutionally permissi-

ble because they could only be imposed without reference to the content of the speech. Similarly, deceptive advertising or commercial
speech concerning illegal acts can be regulated because these areas
are excepted from first amendment protection. The Court in these
cases expressly reserved questions of in-person solicitation, representations of quality in commercial advertising, and broadcast advertising for
future consideration. Although the Court did not directly address the
reserved questions, there are hints in Bates and other recent cases that
the Supreme Court might allow regulation of commercial speech which
refers to the content of the expression, even where there is no allegation that the commercial speech is deceptive or concerns an illegal
transaction.
The hints that content-directed regulation of commercial advertising might, in some cases, be applicable to nondeceptive advertising
are underscored by language used by the Court in Young v. American
Mini Theatres.133 In that case, the Supreme Court sustained a Detroit
ordinance prohibiting "adult" movie theatres, "adult" bookstores, and
other establishments from operating within one thousand feet of each
other.

134

It seems clear that the restriction in Young was imposed based
on the content of the materials regulated. Furthermore, absent a finding that the materials were obscene, there would appear to be no
grounds for finding that the regulated uses were excepted from first
amendment protection. However, the regulation was allowed to withstand first amendment attack despite its reference to the content of
the controlled speech.'3 5
133. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
1134. The ordinance was a zoning regulation which classified eleven different kinds of
establishments as "regulated uses" and prohibited any such establishment from operating
within 1000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential
area. Some of the regulated uses were bars, pawnshops, pool halls, motels and dance
halls. 427 U.S. at 52.
135. Although the majority opinion by Justice Stevens attempts to justify the ordinance
as a valid regulation of the "secondary effects" resulting from concentration of "regulated uses," the analysis fails to stand up in light of the clear content-control orientation
of the ordinance as evidenced by statutory definitions of "adult book store" and "adult
motion picture theatre." See 427 U.S. at 54 n.4-5.
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Based on the willingness of the Supreme Court to permit contentoriented regulation of certain types of expression in Young and other
recent cases,' 36 the Court could sustain regulations of commercial
speech based on references to content, even though the ad was truthful
and nondeceptive.1 7 The likelihood that the Court may adopt such
an approach to commercial speech in the future is supported by Justice
Blackmun's citation in Bates to CapitalBroadcasting Co. v. Mitchell.'3 8
Capital Broadcasting involved a challenge by several broadcasters
to an act of Congress prohibiting the advertisement of cigarettes on
any medium subject to Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction. The prohibition was premised entirely on the content of the forbidden ad. Because Capital Broadcasting antedates the Supreme
Court decisions in Virginia Board, Bates, and even Pittsburgh Press,
the district court discerned no first amendment interest and never considered whether the prohibition might be void based on an impermissible reference to content." 9 In light of these later decisions, however,
there is a serious question as to what Justice Blackmun intended by
his citation to CapitalBroadcastingin Bates.
Justice Blackmun may well have intended to indicate that an inquiry into the content of certain types of commercial speech would
be appropriate in order to determine the permissible scope of regulation of that speech, even where the expression is conceded to be truthful and nondeceptive. If that was the intended meaning, however,
the opinion nonetheless provides no guidance on how to evaluate such
a content-oriented regulation in light of the constitutionally protected
interest of the consumer at stake in every commercial speech case.
One possible approach to this problem was indicated by the
Florida Supreme Court in Harrisv. Beneficial Finance Co. of Jacksonville.140 In that case, a local finance office challenged a state consumer
protection statute prohibiting anyone attempting to collect a consumer
136. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
137. In light of the Court's predictable reluctance to create new constitutional doctrine, it may be expected that most justices will prefer to treat commercial speech regulations as permissible because of presently recognized exceptions to the first amendment.
For example, on the question of in-person solicitation by lawyers reserved by Bates, the
Court would be more likely to allow regulation of such lawyer/client contacts by finding
an inherent tendency of deception than to allow regulation based on some previously
unrecognized content-oriented justification.
138. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971). The case was cited to support the belief of
the majority that a decision on the validity of broadcast advertising should be reserved
because of the peculiar problems associated with regulation of broadcast media.
139. Id. at 584.
140. 338 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1591 (1977).
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debt from communicating with the debtor's employer prior to obtaining
a final judgment. 141 The regulation was based on the content of the
prohibited communication. In addition, Beneficial argued that the
creditor's right to contact an employer about an employee's debt was
protected by the first amendment under the Virginia Board rationale.
The Florida court interpreted Virginia Board as providing first
amendment protection only because of the public interest in, and peculiar consumer need for, the information contained in the retail prescription advertisements. In Harris, however, there was no consumer
need to know that the debtor was in default. Furthermore, the court
did not believe that a debtor's employer had a desire or need for such
information which was so substantial as to require constitutional protection. 142 The court held, in effect, that the constitutional interests which
generally protect some commercial speech were not present in the case.
Because the expression regulated was excepted from the first amend43
ment's protection, regulation based on its content was permissible.1
To summarize, the Supreme Court has not yet clearly stated that
truthful and nondeceptive commercial speech may nonetheless be subject to regulation, justified by the content of the speech. But there
have been broad hints in a number of cases, including Bates, that such
regulation might be permissible under some circumstances. At least
one court has implied a standard of review for content-oriented regulation of commercial speech, based on a public need to know, which
could leave much commercial speech beyond the protection of the first
amendment.
CONCLUSION

In the wake of the Virginia Board decision, one writer noted that:
"After a confusing and unpopular history, the commercial speech doctrine is dead. Advertising is now recognized as a conveyor of information and is entitled to first amendment protection."' 4 4 Moreover, the
note in the American Bar Association Journal which heralded the end
of the total ban on lawyer advertising, as a result of Bates, agreed with
Justice Powell's dissent in the case that the decision would "effect profound changes in the practice of law."' 4 5 Nevertheless, careful scru141. FLx.STAT. ANN. § 559.72(4).
142. 338 So. 2d at 199.
143. Id. See also note 84 supra.
144. Note, 34 WASH. & LEE L. R. 245 (1977).
145. Note, Supreme Court Holds Lawyers May Advertise, 63 A.B.A.L 1093 (1977),
dissenting).
quoting 97 Sup. Ct. at 2712 (Powell, J.,
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tiny of these and other recent commercial speech cases indicate that
the scope of the state's power to regulate commercial speech without
regard to first amendment interests is still quite broad.
It is true, of course, that some ads must now be permitted where
previously the state could have imposed a total prohibition. But it is
equally true that the cases demarcate large areas which, because commercial speech is the subject of regulation, are excepted from first
amendment protection. These exceptions are certainly not consistent
with the premise that the commercial speech doctrine is dead.
Furthermore, notwithstanding Justice Powell's comments in his
Bates dissent, the Supreme Court has yet to indicate that it will permit
so much leeway in professional advertising as to alter the nature of
the legal profession. In fact, Bates is a giant step sideways for the
commercial speech doctrine. The decision merely determines that the
facts are so similar to Virginia Board as to require the same result.
Except for its treatment of the overbreadth issue, Bates in no way extends the ratio decidendi of the Virginia Board decision. If the Supreme Court had desired to place additional limits on commercial
speech exceptions to the first amendment, Bates provided the Court
with an opportunity to do so. That the opportunity was passed over
indicates that the Court will continue to allow broad discretion in state
regulation of commercial speech.
At one time, characterization of a communication as commercial
speech eliminated any necessity for balancing the state regulatory interest against the limitations on regulatory power imposed by the first
amendment. After VirginiaBoard, Bates and other recent commercial
speech cases, such a characterization is now only the first step in an
analysis which may result in the extension of a "second class" protection
to a particular advertisement or other commercial expression. However, commercial speech is still subject to a number of restrictions
which could not constitutionally be imposed on other varieties of
speech. It would be a mistake to assume that the Supreme Court will
not continue to permit states broad latitude in regulating all types of
commercial expression. Bates and Virginia Board point the way down
a very narrow path and the Supreme Court has not as yet demonstrated
any inclination to further widen it.
James B. Franks
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